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We study a simple model of commuting subsidies with two transport modes. City residents 
choose where to live and which mode to use. When all land is owned by city residents, one 
group gains from subsidies what the other loses. With absentee landownership, city residents 
as a group gain at the expense of landowners. Subsidies toward different modes have different 
effects, however, for instance, in one case, rich automobile drivers suffer from transit 
subsidies, while poor transit users may benefit from subsidies to automobiles. 
JEL Code: R14, R48. 
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April 10, 2007 1 Introduction
We study the redistributive eﬀects of commuting subsidies in a monocentric city with two
income groups and two transport modes. City residents choose where to live and which
transport mode to use. Subsidies then redistribute between city residents living at diﬀerent
distances from the city center, and between city residents and absentee landowners.
The paper uses a simpliﬁed version of Borck and Wrede [3], assuming ﬁxed housing
consumption. However, we extend the model by allowing for two transport modes. We
thus combine the analysis of transport subsidies with the study of transport mode choice
as in LeRoy and Sonstelie [9] and Sasaki [10].1 This extension also allows us to introduce
diﬀerent subsidy rates for the diﬀerent transport modes.
We ﬁnd that with resident landownership, subsidies always redistribute between city
residents (as long as mode choice is unaﬀected) and, therefore, one group gains what the
other loses. With absentee landownership, city residents as a group generally beneﬁt from
commuting subsidies at the expense of landowners. In this case, when both groups use
the same mode, they both beneﬁt from subsidies to this mode. When the poor live in
the city center and use public transport while the rich live in the suburbs and use cars,
we ﬁnd that subsidies to public transport hurt the rich, while the poor may beneﬁt from
subsidies to cars. We also examine a case with three distinct areas, where the rich use
public transport in the center and cars in the suburbs, while the poor live between those
groups and use public transport. Here, subsidizing public transit more heavily than cars
hurts and subsidizing cars more heavily beneﬁts the rich, while the eﬀect on the poor is
ambiguous.
In the next section, we introduce our model. We then study three distinct cases of
residence patterns and mode choice: In section 3, both groups use public transit, in section
4 the poor use transit and the rich cars, and in section 5, the rich use both modes (transit
in the center and cars in the suburbs), while the poor use only transit. The last section
concludes the paper.
1See also DeSalvo and Huq [7]. Brueckner and Selod [5] study a similar model where the speed of the
(unique) transport system in a city is chosen endogenously. For a nontechnical discussion of some of these
issues, see Borck [2].
12 The model
We consider a simple model with two groups of individuals living in a monocentric city.
The groups are denoted by i = H,L, and group i has ni homogeneous members. We
assume that group H has high income and L has low income, i.e. yH > yL, where yi is the
income of a member of group i. Income consists of two components:
yi = wi + θiALR,
where wi is the wage of a group i individual, with wH > wL, and θi is the share of the
average land rent ALR accruing to group i members.
Individuals live on plots of land of ﬁxed size. Land consumption by a group i member
is qi with qH ≥ qL, so the rich consume more land than the poor (see, e.g., de Bartolome
and Ross [6]). All city residents commute to the CBD for work. There are two transport
modes, denoted A and B. For example, A may be the automobile and B the bus or some
other form of public transport. Users of mode j = A,B incur a ﬁxed cost of Fj. Further,
the variable round trip commuting cost for an individual of type i living at r km from
the CBD is [(1−sj)tj +φjwi]r, where ti is the monetary value of the per-mile-commuting
costs of mode j, sj the subsidy rate towards mode j, and φj is the time cost (the inverse
of travel speed) of mode j.
Hence, the total cost of using mode j at distance r is Fj + [(1 − sj)tj + φjwi]r. Mode
A has higher ﬁxed cost but lower time costs: FA > FB,φA < φB. In addition we assume
that for both groups, the variable cost of mode A is lower than that of mode B (see Sasaki
[10]):
tA + φAwi < tB + φBwi. (1)
We then get a group speciﬁc cutoﬀ distance, r∗
i,i = H,L, where a member of group i





(1 − sB)tB − (1 − sA)tA + (φB − φA)wi
. (2)
Under the assumptions that the automobile has higher ﬁxed costs but lower variable costs
for both groups than the bus, r∗
i > 0,i = H,L so that close to the CBD individuals will
commute by bus.
Since wH > wL, r∗
H < r∗
L. This implies that if at some distance r, the rich use the bus,
so must the poor, and conversely, if at some r the poor commute by car so do the rich.
2We assume that housing consumption does not enter utility. Therefore utility of an
individual of type i living r km from the CBD if she uses mode j equals consumption
c
j
i = yi − Fj − [(1 − sj)tj + φjwi]r − T − Riqi, for i = H,L and j = A,B. (3)
where R is land rent and T a lump sum tax.
Since each member of group i must attain the same utility level, (3) implies the bid
rent functions (i.e. the maximum rent an individual of group i living at distance r from




yi − Fj − [(1 − sj)tj + φjwi]r − T − ci
qi
, for i = H,L and j = A,B. (4)
The bid rent of group i members is then deﬁned as Ri(r) = max{RA
i ,RB
i } and land rent
at r is R(r) = max{0,RH(r),RL(r)}.
Suppose that both groups use the same transport mode. Then, the group with the
steeper bid rent curve will live closer to the CBD. This implies that the rich live closer to
the CBD than the poor if
(1 − sj)tj + φjwH
qH
>
(1 − sj)tj + φjwL
qL
for j = A,B. (5)
We will assume that this condition holds, which says that the arc income elasticity of
housing consumption is less than the arc income elasticity of variable transport costs. See
also LeRoy and Sonstelie [9], de Bartolome and Ross [6], and also Glaeser et al. [8] who
argue that this is consistent with the available empirical evidence.
The city is linear and extends from the CBD, located at zero, to the urban fringe







The government budget constraint simply states that total tax revenue must equal total










where the ∗ indicates that we consider only the group/mode with the highest bid rent at
r.
3In equilibrium the city is divided into at most four areas, where each area is populated
by members of one group only which all use the same transport mode (see LeRoy and
Sonstelie [9] and Sasaki [10]). At one extreme, all rich and all poor use the same mode,
while at the other extreme, each mode is used by all groups. In this paper, we will consider
three speciﬁc examples with two or three diﬀerent areas where in all examples the poor
use the bus.
3 Both groups commute by bus
Suppose ﬁrst that both groups use the same mode. Since ﬁxed costs are positive, this









L(¯ r) = 0, (9)
with r1 = nHqH and ¯ r = nHqH + nLqL. Equation (9) states that the bid rent of the
outermost resident living at ¯ r just equals the agricultural rent which we normalize to zero.
Equation (8) says that at the border between rich and poor, denoted r1, rich and poor must
be willing to pay the same amount per square meter land. Writing out the expression for
RL(¯ r), using ¯ r = nHqH + nLqL, gives:
RL(¯ r) =
yL − FB − [(1 − sB)tB + φBwL](nLqL + nHqH) − T − cL
qL
. (10)
Setting RL(¯ r) = 0 gives the equilibrium utility of the poor
cL = yL − FB − [(1 − sB)tB + φBwL](nLqL + nHqH) − T. (11)
Using (11) together with r1 = nHqH in (8) gives:
[(1 − sB)tB + φBwL]nHqH
qL
=
yH − FB − [(1 − sB)tB + φBwH]nLqL − T − cH
qH
(12)
Substituting (11) and r1 = nHqH into (4) and solving (12) gives the equilibrium utility
level of the rich:
cH = yH − FB − [(1 − sB)tB + φBwH]nHqH − [(1 − sB)tB + φBwL]nLqH − T. (13)











[(1 − sB)tB + φBwL]r
qL
dr. (14)
Integrating (14) by parts yields
ALR = ATC. (15)
That is in a linear city with linear transport cost, average land rent equals average total
transport costs net of subsidies (Arnott and Stiglitz [1]). This holds regardless of the exact
pattern of mode choice and land use.








Subsidies reduce average land rent regardless of landownership. Furthermore, the sum of
average land rent and lump sum tax is not aﬀected by subsidies.
To see the reason behind this result, we use (11) and (13) in (4) to ﬁnd
RH(0) = nL[(1 − sB)tB + φBwL] + nH[(1 − sB)tB + φBwH] (17)
RL(qHnH) = nL[(1 − sB)tB + φBwL]. (18)
Thus, increasing sB decreases land rent both at the CBD and at the rich/poor border.
Total land rent therefore falls. Subsidizing transport makes both groups’ bid rents ﬂatter.
Since housing consumption is ﬁxed and rent at the city border must be zero, this implies
that aggregate land rent must fall. This is one of the clues to understanding the political
support for commuting subsidies. Since they lead individuals to prefer locations farther
from the center, total land rent falls, and rents fall most for those who live closest to the
center. These are of course the individuals whom one would expect to lose from subsidies
in purely ﬁscal terms.
Finally, we can calculate the lump sum tax and average land rent explicitly and sub-
stitute into (11) and (13). Doing so yields simple expressions for the eﬀect of the subsidy















5Note that subsidies have no eﬃciency eﬀects as long as they leave the type of equilibrium
unaltered. The boundary between the rich and poor area is independent of subsidies, and
we assume mode choice to be unaﬀected by the subsidy. Hence, small changes in subsidies
only redistribute between both groups of commuters and landowners. Total welfare is














Commuters’ gains equal landowners’ losses. This is natural, for instance, Brueckner [4]
found that commuting subsidies in a model like ours but with variable land consumption
are ineﬃcient. In our model with ﬁxed land consumption, subsidies simply redistribute
between commuters and landowners and have no eﬃciency consequences as long as mode
choice is not aﬀected. Therefore, this result also holds in the next subsection – where rich
and poor used diﬀerent modes – as long as subsidies do not aﬀect mode choice.
We will now consider two polar cases of landownership more explicitly. The ﬁrst case
















Since qH ≥ qL, we have:
Proposition 1 Suppose that rich and poor commute by bus and land is owned by absentee
landowners. Then, both rich and poor beneﬁt from a subsidy to public transport. The total
gain to city residents equals the total loss to landowners.
Equations (23) and (24) show that both groups gain from the introduction of commuting
subsidies. The poor have longer commutes and therefore beneﬁt from commuting subsidies
ﬁnanced by head taxes in purely ﬁscal terms, while the rich pay more than they receive in
subsidies. However, the rich incur a larger fall in land rent and the net eﬀect on utility is
therefore qualitatively the same for both groups.
We now consider resident landownership. In particular, suppose that both rich and
poor receive an equal share of aggregate land rent, i.e. θL = θH = 1. (22) shows that
subsidies will either have no eﬀect on utility or it will beneﬁt one group of citizens at the
6expense of the other group. Residents as a group cannot gain from subsidies. This is
shown also by Borck and Wrede [3] in the case with variable land consumption when the













Therefore, we have the following result:
Proposition 2 Suppose that rich and poor commute by bus and land is owned by city
residents in equal proportions. Suppose further that the rich consume more land than the
poor. Then, increasing the level of subsidies beneﬁts the rich at the expense of the poor.
4 Poor commute by bus, rich by car
The second case we consider is that where the poor live in the center and commute by
bus, while the rich live in the suburbs and commute by car. LeRoy and Sonstelie [9] and
Glaeser et al. [8] argue that the availability of fast but expensive transport modes was
responsible for the suburbanization of wealthy city residents in the US.
At the border between the poor and rich, the poor bid rent function when they commute
by bus must be steeper than the rich bid rent function when those use the car:
(1 − sB)tB + φBwL
qL
>
(1 − sA)tA + φAwH
qH
. (26)
We proceed like in the previous section, leaving out much of the detail, however. The







H(¯ r) = 0. (27)
Solving for the equilibrium utility of poor and rich gives:
cL = yL − FB − [(1 − sB)tB + φBwL]nLqL − [(1 − sA)tA + φAwH]nHqL − T (28)
cH = yH − FA − [(1 − sA)tA + φAwH](nLqL + nHqH) − T. (29)
The head tax which satisﬁes the government budget is now
T =
sBtBn2
LqL/2 + sAtAnH(nLqL + nHqH/2)
nL + nH
(30)
7and average land rent
ALR =
[(1 − sB)tB + φBwL]n2
LqL/2 + [(1 − sA)tA + φAwH]nH(nHqH + nLqL/2)
nL + nH
. (31)
Using (30) and (31) in (28) and (29) gives expressions for the utility levels as functions of
the subsidy rates sA,sB.




























This is summarized as:
Proposition 3 Suppose that the poor live in the center and commute by bus, while the
rich live in the suburbs and commute by car. If land ownership is absentee, subsidizing
buses will beneﬁt the poor and harm the rich, while subsidizing cars will beneﬁt the rich.
The poor beneﬁt from subsidies to cars iﬀ qL > qH/2.
Each group beneﬁts from a subsidy to its own mode, which is cross-subsidized by
the other group. However, the proposition shows an asymmetry: the rich who live in the
suburbs dislike subsidies to public transport, while the poor city residents may like subsidies
to suburbian automobile users. This is because housing market pressure is relieved for
the poor when the mode used by the rich is subsidized. When rich housing (and thus
commuting distances) is not too large relative to the poor, this eﬀect is large enough to
compensate for the ﬁscal loss of the poor.
Second, we consider again full resident landownership. Again, subsidies redistribute























Thus, we have shown:
8Proposition 4 Suppose that the poor live in the center and commute by bus, while the
rich live in the suburbs and commute by car. If land is owned by all city residents in equal
proportions, subsidizing buses will beneﬁt the poor and hurt the rich, while subsidizing cars
will beneﬁt the rich and hurt the poor.
5 Poor bus users surrounded by rich commuters
From the possible equilibria with three diﬀerent areas we choose one where rich car drivers
live in the outskirts of town. From our assumption (5) follows that the rich live close to the
CBD where they use the bus and that the poor also drive by bus and live in the middle. In
contrast to equilibria with only two areas, subsidies now have eﬃciency eﬀects, since they
aﬀect modal choices and the residence patterns. For the sake of simpliﬁcation, we assume
equal lot sizes in this section, namely that qH = qL = 1. Hence, only the eﬃcient use of











H(¯ r) = 0, (38)
where r1 is the boundary between rich and poor bus users, r2 separates poor bus users and
rich car drivers, and ¯ r = nHqH + nLqL is still the urban fringe. From these equilibrium
conditions we immediately obtain the equilibrium utility for the rich:
cH = wH + θHALR − T − FA − [(1 − sA)tA + φAwH](nHqH + nLqL). (39)





FA − Fj + [(1 − sA)tA + φAwH](nHqH + nLqL) − [(1 − sj)tj + φjwH]r
qH
. (40)
Equation (39) allows to decompose the impact on utility of the rich when subsidies are









+ (nHqH + nLqL)tA, (41)















Figure 1: Higher subsidies for cars
Subsidies aﬀect utility of this group only via the lump sum tax, via average land rent and
– possibly – via monetary commuting costs at the urban fringe.





(1 − sA)tA + φAwH
qH
(nHqH + nLqL − r2) −
(1 − sB)tB + φBwL
qL
(r − r2). (43)
Since housing is ﬁxed, subsidies do not change the size of the low-income area. They
move both boundaries of the low-income area by the same amount either outwards or
inwards. Using (40) and (43) we can calculate the impact of subsidy changes on bid rent
curves. Consider ﬁrst subsidies for cars going to the rich in the outermost area. From
(40) follows that the bid rent function of rich car drivers becomes ﬂatter and the bid rent
function of rich bus drivers shifts downwards. (43) implies, that car subsidies do not aﬀect
the slope of poor citizens’ bid rent curve. Taking into account that the size of the middle
area does not change, the bid rent curve of poor residents shifts downwards (see ﬁgure
1). Since all bid rent curves move downwards, average land rent unambiguously falls. Car
subsidies clearly hurt landowners, since lot sizes are ﬁxed. It seems natural to think that
the poor move inwards, more high income individuals use the car and less the bus. Indeed,





tA[FB − FA + φBnL(wL − wH)]
[(1 − sA)tA + φAwH − (1 − sB)tB − φBwH]2 < 0, (44)
where n1
H denotes the number of rich commuters living in the inner area.
In order to analyze subsidies for buses, we proceed like before. As can be seen from





Figure 2: Higher subsidies for buses
bid rent curve of rich bus users. Bus subsidies change the position of the bid rent curve of
poor commuters and also ﬂatten the curve (see (43)). Again, we can use the ﬁxed size of
the middle area to conclude that poor residents move outwards in equilibrium (see ﬁgure
2). Less high income individuals live in the outer area and drive by car, some move to the
central area and use the bus. The impact on average land rent and, thus, on landowners,
is a priori unclear: while land rent in the inner central area and in the outer part of the
middle area increase, land rent may decrease around the boundary between the inner and
the middle area.




tj(sjtj − sktk)[FB − FA + φBnL(wL − wH)]2
[(1 − sA)tA + φAwH − (1 − sB)tB − φBwH]3, for j,k = A,B,k 6= j. (45)
Due to our assumption (1) the denominator is negative when subsidies are suﬃciently simi-
lar and do not reverse the order of variable transport costs. Independent of landownership,
an increase in subsidy rate sj raises welfare if sjtj < sktk. In order to rule out a distortion
of transport mode choice, total subsidies per km should be equalized. Hence, we have
shown:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the poor live in the middle area and commute by bus, while
the rich live either in the suburbs and commute by car or close to the center and commute
by bus. Suppose further that subsidies do not alter the relative size of variable transport
costs. Then, narrowing the range of subsidies per km raises welfare.
Since our focus is on the distributional impact of commuting subsidies, we will rule out
eﬃciency eﬀects by analyzing small subsidy changes starting at sBtB = sAtA. Again we
11will consider two polar cases of landownership: absentee landowners (θH = θL = 0) and
equal resident landownership (θH = θL = 1).




tB[FB − FA + φBnL(wL − wH)][FA − FB + φB(nL + 2nH)(wL − wH)]




tB[FB − FA + φBnL(wL − wH)]2
2(nH + nL)[tB + φBwH − tA − φAwH]2 < 0. (47)
We skip analytical results for car subsidies, since the terms are rather cumbersome. Since
eﬃciency eﬀects are excluded by the starting condition sBtB = sAtA, which means that
small subsidy changes leave welfare unaltered, in total residents gain from car subsidies at
the expense of landowners (who – as we have shown before – are clearly hurt). Additional
subsidies for cars increase taxes, but reduce land prices. However, (39) implies that the rich
gain since transport costs for the outermost car driver are higher than average transport
costs. Thus we have shown:
Proposition 6 Suppose that the poor live in the middle area and commute by bus, while
the rich live either in the suburbs and commute by car or in the center and commute by
bus. If landowners are absentee, subsidizing buses more heavily than cars will hurt the rich
and subsidizing cars more heavily than buses will beneﬁt the rich. The eﬀects of subsidies
on the poor are ambiguous.
Although some high income earners use buses, the rich are hurt by higher subsidies
for public transport which lead to larger subsidy payments for more people with longer
commutes. Hence, those high income commuters who still drive by car suﬀer from higher
taxes without any beneﬁt (as follows from (39)), since land rents are unaﬀected (see ﬁgure
2). The poor, however, gain from subsidies but suﬀer from higher taxes.
With resident landownership one income class wins exactly what the other loses (still




nHφBtA(wH − wL)[FB − FA + φBnL(wL − wH)]



















Thus, we have shown:
12Proposition 7 Suppose that the poor live in the middle area and commute by bus, while
the rich live either in the suburbs and commute by car or in the center and commute by bus.
If land is owned by all city residents in equal proportions, subsidizing buses more heavily
than cars will beneﬁt the poor at the expense of the rich, while subsidizing cars more heavily
than buses will beneﬁt the rich at the expense of the poor.
Since welfare remains unchanged, the opposing interests of landowning residents follows
immediately from (22). Furthermore, it is not surprising that subsidizing cars beneﬁts the
rich, since the poor use only public transport.
6 Conclusion
The paper has studied the incidence of subsidies to urban public and private transport in
a setting with two income groups and endogenous mode choice. As shown by, e.g., LeRoy
and Sonstelie [9] and Sasaki [10], there are many possible equilibrium patterns, and we
have only used three of them to illustrate the possibilities here. In a more general model
with variable housing consumption, the analysis would get much more complicated but also
more realistic. We believe that the approach should be fruitful to examine urban transport
policies in a uniﬁed framework, where mode choice and residence patterns are determined
simultaneously.
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